Updated October 8, 2023 — The podcast below was recorded earlier this week before the horrific events in Israel and Gaza. However, while the focus of the podcast is on Israel’s efforts to halt Iran’s nuclear program, it clearly lays out what could be considered the precursor to the Hamas attack in Gaza. The weakness and division within Israel, the broad effort to isolate Iran through the Abraham Accords, and attempts to establish peace between Israel and Saudi Arabia are all contributing factors.
October 6, 2023 — While Iran may not be dominating today’s headlines, its nuclear ambitions are as fervent as ever. Equally unyielding is Israel’s determination — covert or otherwise — to thwart these ambitions.
On this week’s exclusive WhoWhatWhy podcast, Yonah Jeremy Bob, a senior analyst for the Jerusalem Post and former high-ranking Israeli official, pulls back the curtain on Israel’s covert operations against Iran.
Bob’s latest book, Target Tehran, offers a rare glimpse into Israel’s multilayered strategy to counter Iran through sabotage, cyberwarfare, assassination, and secret diplomacy.
Despite international agreements designed to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, Bob maintains that Iran has never ceased its quest to attain such an arsenal, including efforts to enrich uranium to levels alarmingly close to weaponization.
Bob ties Israel’s covert actions to the recent seismic geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, notably the Abraham Accords. These historic agreements, which have led to the normalization of relations between Israel and several Sunni Arab states, are not just diplomatic milestones; they are part of a larger, calculated strategy driven by a shared fear of Shiite Iran.
Bob concludes on an unsettling note, leaving open the question of whether Israel’s covert intelligence operations could jeopardize these new regional alliances, which aim to forestall the advent of a nuclear-armed, regionally aggressive Iran.
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(As a service to our readers, we provide transcripts with our podcasts. We try to ensure that these transcripts do not include errors. However, due to a constraint of resources, we are not always able to proofread them as closely as we would like and hope that you will excuse any errors that slipped through.)
Jeff: Welcome to the WhoWhatWhy podcast. I’m your host, Jeff Schechtman. It’s been 21 years since former George W. Bush speechwriter David Frum wrote the phrase “axis of evil” referring to, among other places, Iran and North Korea: both nations with insatiable nuclear ambition. And while we’ve been able to do little about North Korea, Iran’s threat has been at least slowed down by the clandestine efforts of Israel and its allies. John Le Carré once spoke of the moral twilight that shrouds the world of espionage. This sense of ambiguity is the driving force behind real polity, particularly in the ever-shifting landscape of the Middle East.
My guest today, Yonah Jeremy Bob, is a leading voice in military and intelligence analysis and a senior analyst for the Jerusalem Post. He’s been at the forefront of pivotal developments in the region, and his latest work, Target Tehran, delves into Israel’s covert operations aimed at thwarting those Iranian nuclear ambitions. But this is more than a tale of spycraft. It’s a narrative that has, perhaps serendipitously, reshaped the Middle East, leading to historic accords that have transformed the region’s geopolitical landscape, even while not fully stopping Iran’s nuclear goals.
Again in the words of Le Carré, espionage is the secret theater of our society, and Yonah Jeremy Bob’s work is a testament to that. With a background that includes roles in the Israeli military international law division and the Israeli embassy to the UN, he brings unparalleled expertise to a discussion of Iran today. It is my pleasure to welcome Yonah Jeremy Bob to talk about Target Tehran: How Israel Is Using Sabotage, Cyberwarfare, Assassination — and Secret Diplomacy — to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Create a New Middle East. Yonah Jeremy Bob, welcome to the WhoWhatWhy podcast.
Yonah: So glad to be here.
Jeff: Well, it’s great to have you here. Talk a little bit about the gap between when Iran’s nuclear ambitions began, when there began to be real activity towards them trying to actually get a nuclear weapon, and the efforts that you talk about to slow them down or to stop them in that effort.
Yonah: Sure. And jump in if I go on for too long because this question could be hours or weeks. But they started in the 1990s, and Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was the father of the Iranian atomic bomb and who we introduced in the book — there’s been snippets about him in the media over the years, but we really give him basically a whole chapter — and he comes out in a number of places throughout the book, was working on this for decades. And in the early stages, they’re working. To develop a nuclear weapon, you need to do many, many skill sets. You need to figure out special kinds of detonation issues; you can’t just light a match, even if you have uranium right there making their nuclear bombs out of uranium.
You can also make them out of plutonium, but they’re making them out of uranium. If they do it, you have to figure out the centrifuges. Those are the machines that spin really fast that enrich the uranium. And then there’s the different levels of enrichment. Under the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran that the Obama administration signed, they were supposed to stay under 5% enrichment, which is a very low level. And then, when they broke that, they went up to 20%, and now they’re at 60%, which is extremely close to the 90% weaponization level. And at this point, they have, according to different estimates, between five to seven in terms of quantity of enriched uranium that could be a nuclear weapon. If they decided to break out and try to finish the remaining skills, they have about five to seven potential nuclear weapons.
And again, they went slowly but steadily also through the 2000s. And by 2002, Meir Dagan, who was the head of the Mossad at the time, initiates a massive operation on a whole bunch of different fronts, not just covert military but also hacking and going after financing and supply chains, and that continues in the time of Tamir Pardo, 2011 to 2016. And we discuss all of that in a couple of chapters, but the bulk of the book is that usually Mossad books are about events that happen 50 years ago, 25 years ago, because Israel just doesn’t disclose; they don’t declassify. They’re even worse than the CIA in terms of how long they wait. And this book is 60, 70% of it all things that have happened this year, last year. 2020 is probably the highlight in terms of the number of major things, and 2018 is a major event.
So things that really just happened, and we were very lucky to be able to get permission to disclose a lot of it in unprecedented fashion. Very lucky to get access also to Yossi Cohen, who is the Mossad director, 2016 to 2021, as well as current Mossad officials — I can’t specify who because they’re still serving — and a number of other top officials in Israel and in the United States. The last several years, Iran has really pushed hard, and despite many Mossad successes, despite the fact that Mossad has delayed Iran by decades, right now at this moment, Iran is closer to nuclear bomb than the have ever been.
Jeff: Many of these secret, covert efforts by Israel to stop the Iranian development of the nuclear bomb were going on at precisely the same time that diplomatic efforts were going on at the same time the JCPOA was being negotiated and put in place in 2015. Talk about that dichotomy: the fact that these efforts were going on simultaneously with diplomatic efforts.
Yonah: Right. So this has been an extremely tricky dance for Israel because Israel still sees the United States as the big brother, as its primary diplomatic backer, as a country that provides tremendous military and economic aid for Iron Dome, the anti-missile defense system, and other aspects of Israel’s defense and as its best friend in terms of democracy and culture, and so the United States is very important to Israel.
And both the United States and Israel do view Iran as a threat. But if the United States use Iran and a possible nuclear weapons program as a general threat that’s far away that can’t hit it, even if Iran had nuclear weapons, Israel has been within Iran’s range of ballistic missiles since the 1990s. Israel views Iran and nuclear weapons that is an existential threat to its existence. And so, when the United States under the Obama administration was negotiating the JCPOA, the 2015 nuclear deal, Israel was very opposed.
When I say opposed, it’s not like other issues in Israel. If you take, let’s say, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, there’s a split in Israel. Some people are on the left, believe in a two-state solution giving land for peace, some people on the right against the two-state solution or want to give back less land to the Palestinians. And there’s a real split there in Israel. On Iran, it’s about 90 to 100% of the population left-right views Iran as a threat. And so there’s tremendous backing for Israel to take whatever actions it needs to to prevent that from happening, but there were certain years where Israel had to stop or be very much more careful because of the diplomacy. And Israel did hope that diplomacy would teach Iran to really fully give up its nuclear weapons program, but that never happened.
And so we started in 2018 this incredible operation. I think it’s the most incredible operation in the history of espionage, where Israel stole or borrowed Iran’s nuclear secrets from under its nose in the heart of Tehran in a neighborhood called Shirobad and brings the physical files. This isn’t like a disc gun key that you put into a computer. They brought tons of physical files back to Israel. And this exposed Iran’s lies; this exposed that Iran had never stopped the nuclear program. They had slowed things down. They had put some things underground. Certainly, they were technically complying with certain aspects of the nuclear deal, the JCPOA, but part of the JCPOA was you have to come completely clean on the military aspects of the program. They never did that. This exposed that very clearly, and up to this day, five years after that operation, the IAEA, the international nuclear inspectors, are still pressuring Iran to get answers about a lot of those issues, and they have not answered the questions. And I give some credit to the IAEA that because of that, they’ve kept the probes into their nuclear past open.
Jeff: In what way have these covert operations by Israel actually exacerbated the tensions between Israel and Iran?
Yonah: So that’s a very complicated question. Obviously, when Israel and the Mossad, and I have to say because I’m under the Israeli censor, according to foreign sources, according to Iran, blew up Iran’s nuclear facility in Natanz in July 2020 and then blew up another nuclear facility at Natanz in April 2021 and another nuclear facility in Karaj in June 2021.
And I could list many others. The other things I just want to flag because of their major, major points in history and for the relations between the countries and the globe. The assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the head of the Quds force: If you can imagine somebody being the head of both the CIA and the FBI, that’s how much power he had. He was assassinated by the United States but with tremendously helpful intelligence from Israel. And the assassination of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh — I mentioned him earlier; he was the father of the Iranian bomb — in November 2020, also attributed to Israel. So each of those events definitely escalates, exacerbates, causes Iran to try to hit back at Israel or hit back at Jews traveling around the world.
But from the Israeli perspective, waiting until it’s too late is far worse. In other words, how you take the example of Hezbollah in Lebanon in Israel’s north. Today, they have 150,000 rockets that can hit Israel. And when Israel has a problem with Hezbollah, it’s not exactly sure what to do because if Israel attacks, Hezbollah can shoot 150,000 rockets at it. And part of that happened because as you know, there were all kinds of diplomatic deals that Hezbollah wasn’t supposed to take on new weapons after a war between Hezbollah and Israel in 2006.
And they violated the rules. And Israel was saying, “Well, should we strike? But that could start a war.” And so now, Israel’s in a position where if there’s a war, it’ll be in a much worse position. So with Iran, Israel said, “We can’t take that risk. It is actually preferable to risk some tension with Iran now than it is to wait until it could get a nuclear weapon, and it’s too late for us to do something.”
Jeff: Is there any question that Iran is going to get a nuclear weapon at some point?
Yonah: Nobody knows the answer to that. I will tell you that I am absolutely convinced that if Iran in the near future, the next year or two, tries to cross that boundary that Israel would launch not just covert strikes by the Mossad but a overt, preemptive strike, massive, by the Israeli Air Force. I’ve seen in some classified briefings some massive amounts of targets that Israel has drawn up using artificial intelligence and machine learning.
So I do believe that Israel would prevent Iran in the next couple years, if Iran tried to do that. If you’re asking me, “Can Israel permanently prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon five years from now, 10 years from now, 15 years from now?” Again, nobody knows the answer to that. Israel has succeeded in preventing Iran for about 30 years, but it is a country of over 80 million people. It’s a huge country where they can hide a lot.
They’ve gained tremendous nuclear knowledge in recent years. It’s hard to say whether they can be prevented forever. I think the Israeli hope is they can be prevented long enough that eventually there will be a regime change and that the next regime maybe won’t want nuclear weapons. But we leave it in the book as an open question that Mossad’s work may never be completely done.
Jeff: Talk about other nations in the region that have an equivalent concern about Iran getting a nuclear weapon.
Yonah: Yes. So I think this is one of the most interesting aspects of our book is we tie together the Mossad secret war against Iran’s nuclear program with the Mossad secret war in the Abraham Accords. I’ll just move back for a second. You tell me if I’m explaining too much. But the Abraham Accords started or being signed in August 2020, and the first deal was between Israel and the United Arab Emirates: a small but very important and economically powerful country in the Gulf of Sunni Arabs.
You have 1,000 or more than a 1,000 year conflict between Sunni Arabs like the UAE, Bahrain, which also signed a deal with Israel. Saudi Arabia is the main power there, which Israel is hoping to do normalization with. And which all of the other normalization deals, Abraham Accords deals, couldn’t have happened without their blessing. But we can talk as a separate question about whether there would be a normalization with the Saudis.
Anyway, all of those countries are Sunni, and Iran is Shi’ite. And so there’s a conflict between these countries. A lot of people would say that they’ve hated each other over the years, even more than some of them used to hate Israel. And now Israel has normalization with the UAE, with Bahrain, also with Morocco, also with Sudan. And those are four countries that all signed deals with Israel in 2020 after a 25-year gap.
The last deals that had been signed with Israel and Arab countries had been Jordan in the 1990s and Egypt, of course, in 1978 with the Camp David Accords. So basically, there’s a huge change in the region. Suddenly Israel and Arab countries, if they’re Sunnis anyway, are getting along really well. There’s billions of dollars of business, huge amounts of tourism going back and forth between these countries.
The Egypt-Israel peace is called a cold peace. These countries, it’s a warm peace. It’s a full peace. And how did that happen? One of the major factors was they were afraid of Iran. And if there’s a bipartisan area of American foreign policy in the Middle East, it’s that both the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations have all been slowly withdrawing, have a smaller American military footprint, a smaller American footprint in general in the Middle East. And the Sunni countries, like the Saudis, UAE, Bahrain, who have relied on the United States to defend them from Iran and other dangers for a very long time, said, “Hey, the United States isn’t here to protect us anymore. Who can protect us? Israel.”
And they actually already, even though the Saudis haven’t signed normalization, the Saudis, UAE, Bahrain, a number of other countries that can’t go on the record, are already in a regional missile defense with Israel. They’re not just sharing general intelligence, they’re sharing operational defensive intelligence. So there have been instances where Iran sent drones or other combat operations to try to attack an Arab country, and Israel helped them stop it. And there have been instances where Iran sent these attacks against Israel and an Arab country helped Israel stop it.
And that’s already happening. And again, a lot of that is the common threat of Iran, of the Shi’ite side of the coin in the Middle East, brought together a lot of Sunni Arabs and Israel. And it’s a remarkable change in the Middle East, which could again, if there’s a deal with the Saudis and Israel could remake the Middle East in even much greater ways.
Jeff: Is there a danger that if Israel oversteps in its clandestine activities and its attacks on Iran in trying to slow down the nuclear weapons program, then it could do something to alienate all of these new friends? Because the truth is it really is under the rubric of “The enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
Yonah: Right. So look, if Israel did something that led to a regional war, which led to these countries being attacked because of their alliance with Israel in a major way, then obviously that could damage the alliance. But what you’ve seen until now is that these countries, it may not always make news in the United States, but Iran and its proxies in Yemen have been for years, it’s slowed down now, but for years have been shooting rockets into Saudi Arabia, blowing up buildings and people in Saudi Arabia, and planning terror attacks against people in the UAE and Bahrain.
So basically, these countries have already been hit very hard by Iran. Also, economically, Iran took shots at the Saudi oil industry — a major attack in 2019 and attacks since then.
And so they’re already feeling that. I think the alienation probably is more likely would be with the United States or portions of the United States and with Europe. Europe is almost always opposed to any military action. And so I do think that one of the reasons that Israel has used the Mossad is because it can avoid taking credit. So the 2018 operation where they stole Iran’s nuclear archives, nobody died and they took credit for that.
But all of these other operations, if you read the book carefully, there’s all sorts of hinting and winking, but Israel still doesn’t come completely out and say, “Yes, we killed this person,” “Yes, we blew up this facility.” And that’s one of the reasons they use the Mossad: in order to avoid an escalation to allow the Iranians to save face. So if the Iranians want to say that it wasn’t Israel or that it was just a gas leak, they can say that sometimes, and it leaves them the opportunity to not have to escalate into war to save them from embarrassment.
Whereas if there was a massive airstrike, there would be no way that Israel could shield this. So that’s one of the reasons that Israel has used the Mossad until now. If there was a massive Israeli airstrike, yes, I think, unfortunately, there would be a general war. And so that’s why Israel hasn’t done that, and I don’t think would do that, unless they really felt Iran was crossing the line.
Jeff: The fact that Israel has its own nuclear program and its own nuclear weapons, to what extent does that have any impact at all on other nations in the Middle East, right now?
Yonah: That is a great question. We do deal with it briefly. And there’s different perspectives on this. Look, the reason that Israel, and still I’m under the Israeli censor, [Yonah laughs] Israel incredibly still doesn’t fully admit about its nuclear weapons program. The official line is Israel will not be the first to introduce, I think, the use or using nuclear weapons in the Middle East, something along those lines. But according to foreign sources that everybody recognizes, Israel has somewhere between 80 to 200 nuclear weapons and a triad of nuclear weapons, meaning they can launch from both sea, air, and land. And so Israel has a formidable nuclear weapons capability.
The history is that Israel developed its program in the 1950s and 1960s when it was weaker than Egypt and Syria and a number of other countries. And it believed that if it developed nuclear weapons that even if it was militarily weaker and surrounded by hundreds of millions of Arabs who wanted to destroy Israel that if it developed a nuclear weapon, that would make sure that it could survive forever. There’s all kinds of apocrypha about in 1973, the Yom Kippur War, when Egypt initially had tremendous success against Israel and destroyed a whole bunch of Israeli army positions and was galloping across the Sinai towards Israel, and the Syrians were galloping through the Golan, the north. And there were people in Israel who were worried about the country actually being wiped out that maybe they were getting ready to use a nuclear weapon.
And then at that point, the Egyptians stopped because they didn’t want to see what would happen. Unclear if it’s true or not, but the point is it is something that’s been in the back of the head of any Arab leader who might think that they could actually wipe out Israel from the late 1960s on has known that they could face nuclear retaliation. That’s sort of the reason Israel has it.
On the other hand, I think you’re right. I think people do argue that if Israel didn’t have a nuclear program, Iran might be less incentivized to have a nuclear program. The Saudis might be less incentivized to have a nuclear program. And anytime you have more nuclear programs in a place, it encourages proliferation. And then the question for Israel is just what’s the dilemma? Is Israel in greater danger because of proliferation but having this sort of secret card it can play to scare people off from trying to wipe it out? Or is it in greater danger because of the proliferation and that the secret card at this point maybe isn’t worth as much? It’s a very hard question to answer.
Jeff: Is Israel willing to acknowledge at any point that the solution to the Iran nuclear problem might be through diplomacy in any way?
Yonah: That’s a very difficult question. We in our book absolutely argue that you need both diplomacy and a viable military threat. If you only have a viable military threat, then you’re going to get nowhere because, even if you bomb Iran, they can rebuild, and you can’t bomb knowledge. They’ve developed tremendous knowledge. At some point, if you don’t have a diplomatic solution that addresses Iran’s concerns in some way or another, then you’re right. Iran isn’t going to stay in the box, so to speak.
On the other hand, simply diplomacy by itself: Iran is a very tough country, and when they’ve just been offered diplomatic and economic incentives that has not stopped them from going after the nuclear program. In fact, I would argue that when they signed the JCPOA in 2015, which followed the interim deal that they signed in 2012 and 2013, that what got them there was a mix of global sanctions, and they really believed also that Benjamin Netanyahu was willing to hit them if they didn’t cut a deal.
I think that those two things, you need them together. You’re right that sometimes some of the demands that Israel makes in the diplomatic process may be too maximalist and that sometimes Israel may need to reconcile itself with Iran maintaining certain aspects of its program, certain economic issues, certain power issues that Israel would rather Iran not have. In fairness to Israel, Israel feels that it’s already at war with Iran with Iran smuggling weapons to attack it from Syria, with Hezbollah being a proxy for Iran threatening Israel from Lebanon, with Islamic Jihad launching rockets at Israel from Gaza.
That’s a separate terror group from Hamas which rules Gaza. Hamas is Sunni; they don’t answer to Iran. They work with Iran, but Islamic Jihad answers directly to Iran, and they’re in Gaza and have fought several rounds with Israel. Again, these are very complex issues, but I would agree from my perspective when we argue in the book you need both diplomacy and a viable military threat.
Jeff: To what extent do we know the degree to which the Iranian people are aware of some of these actions that the Mossad has taken against the Iranian nuclear program and to the extent that the Iranian population knows this. Is this an impediment to future regime change?
Yonah: Wow. You’re asking some great questions today. Look, there are certain things they definitely know. For example, those two top officials I mentioned, Soleimani from the Quds force and Fakhrizadeh the nuclear chief: When they were assassinated, there was no way to hide it, and they did huge public funerals. The entire country had days of mourning. It was televised nationally in Iran; the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, showed up for some of the funerals. Top generals showed up for the funerals. Everybody knew about these.
Some of the nuclear facilities, it’s more touch and go what the Iranians know, what they don’t know. There’s tremendous censorship there, but there are also large groups of Iranians that are able to get global news. It also might depend where you are, if you’re in a Kurdish or Baloch area of Iran. There’s 20 million Iranian minorities. Then they probably know more what’s going on. If you’re in a Shi’ite part of Iran that’s more of the regime stronghold, they may know less. But it’s not like they don’t know that some of these things are happening.
Does that turn the average Iranian more or less against Israel? It’s a very tough question because I don’t think there are almost any Iranians who are favorable toward Israel. People who think that if a reformist took over Iran that suddenly would be peace between Iran and Israel. I think that’s naive, but a reformist might just be less interested in war, might just be less interested in terrorism.
It is tricky. Israel does try to broadcast some messages of peace to the Iranian people and say, “Look, we’re not at war with you. We’re at war with the regime which is oppressing you.” Does that always work? I don’t know. I’m sure that there are a number of Iranians who are sort of middle-of-the-road Iranians who aren’t particularly fans of the regime, but when the country gets hit by the Mossad or Israel in some way, they probably do take it personally. It probably does turn some of them against Israel. I think Israel tries to, again, make that communication nuance of being against the regime and not against the country. I don’t think it always works, and I think Israel feels like it needs to do that, otherwise, it could be physically endangered, existentially endangered by an Iranian nuclear weapon.
Jeff: And finally, all of these changes that are taking place in the broader Middle East region, the Abraham Accord, some of the things you talked about before. Is it your sense that these things are going to stick at this point? Have they crossed a point where this is becoming accepted policy, or are they still very fragile?
Yonah: Our argument is the Abraham Accords are going to stick. And we have two chapters towards the end of the book. There was some point where we thought the book might have come out earlier, and then we would’ve had less follow-up. But because the book came out when it did, we were able to follow two years of Abraham Accords data, and there is, again, warm peace.
I was in the UAE. I talked to a lot of Emiratis, and they are big fans of Israel. They’re big fans of Israel’s dotcom, cyber, economy, its innovation, its technology. It’s not just at this point about being against Iran. It’s also about really tremendous technological sharing and UAE benefiting from Israeli technology. Again, economic trade in the billions between the countries: I don’t think that’s going away.
Another proof to that point would be there have been a number of conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians since the Abraham Accords, and not after any of those conflicts did the trade stop. Was there some criticism? Would they all wish that Israel would make certain concessions to the Palestinians to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Absolutely. And if Israel wants a deal with the Saudis, it will need to make some larger concessions to the Palestinians because the Saudis will not sign a deal without larger concessions.
At the end of the day, part of what has happened is a number of Arab countries in the Middle East said, “You know what? It’s not just Israel’s fault. It’s also the Palestinians’ fault. Sometimes they’re being too stubborn. Sometimes they’re asking for too much. There have been deals that have been offered to them where they could have gotten already back 90 or 94% of the West Bank and a number of other things, and we’re not going to wait for them. If the Palestinians have trouble signing a deal with Israel, we don’t need the entire region to be in conflict. We don’t need to lose security, economic, and technological gains that we can get from Israel. We’re going to move forward anyway.” That’s what I heard was in the UAE. That’s what I see from the Abraham Accords.
Again, it won’t get past a certain point, if there isn’t some more progress of Palestinians without a deal between Israel and the Saudis, but the progress that has been made I think is locked-in. What does locked-in mean? 50 years from now I can’t tell you, but let’s say for the next five or 10 years, it is a significant trend, it’s not just a blip.
Jeff: Yonah Jeremy Bob, the book is Target Tehran: How Israel Is Using Sabotage, Cyberwarfare, Assassination – and Secret Diplomacy – to Stop a Nuclear Iran and Create a New Middle East. Yonah I thank you so much for spending time with us here on the WhoWhatWhy podcast.
Yonah: My pleasure. Thank you for the talk.
Jeff: Thank you. And thank you for listening and joining us here on the WhoWhatWhy podcast. I hope you join us next week for another Radio WhoWhatWhy podcast. I’m Jeff Schechtman. If you like this podcast, please feel free to share and help others find it by rating and reviewing it on iTunes. You can also support this podcast and all the work we do, by going to whowhatwhy.org/donate.
