Saturday Hashtag: #BioLabProliferation

The recent investigation findings from the 2024 Bio-Lab chemical fire in Conyers, GA, renewed questions about the safety, oversight, and regulation of facilities handling hazardous materials. 

The incident occurred after water came into contact with reactive chemicals stored at the facility, releasing toxic smoke and leading to evacuations and shelter-in-place warnings for nearby communities. 

Beyond the immediate safety failures, the incident highlighted a broader concern: whether regulatory systems have kept pace with the rapid expansion of high-risk facilities. 

This concern extends beyond just chemical facilities to the dramatic growth of high-containment biolaboratories since 9/11. 

Before her resignation as director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard drew attention to this expansion by claiming that the United States has funded a vast network of overseas biological laboratories, with more than 120 facilities in over 30 countries now under intelligence review.

According to the Government Accountability Office, before 9/11, the United States had only five Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) laboratories (page 2 of linked document), including the CDC facility in Atlanta and Fort Detrick in Maryland, an early US human biological research and biodefense facility established in 1943.

The United States established its first high-containment facility for foreign animal research in 1954: the Plum Island Animal Disease Center in New York.

This BSL-3Ag facility focused on threats to livestock rather than human pathogens. Its mission is now transitioning to the National Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in Kansas, which has BSL-3Ag and BSL-4 capabilities.

Today, not including illegal labs, there are 15 (page 60 of linked document) legitimate BSL-4 laboratories in the United States, with only fragmented federal oversight and local regulation. 

Current US biosafety oversight mechanisms include:

• Select Agent Regulations (SAR)
• Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL)
• NIH Guidelines for Recombinant or Synthetic Nucleic Acid Research
• OSHA Workplace Safety Regulations
• EPA Environmental Regulations
• Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs)

Worldwide, there are an estimated 110 BSL-4 laboratories and 3,515 Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) facilities in 149 countries, where researchers can work with dangerous pathogens including anthrax, plague, and hantaviruses.

The growth accelerated after 9/11 as governments invested heavily in biodefense, disease research, and pandemic preparedness. While laboratory capacity expanded rapidly, oversight has not kept pace.

There is no single international authority responsible for tracking every high-containment laboratory, reviewing all research conducted inside them, or enforcing one global biosafety standard. Oversight remains divided among governments, funding agencies, and individual institutions.

Critics argue that biological hazards represent one of the most serious national security threats. Unlike traditional warfare, a biological catastrophe does not require a deliberate attack. A laboratory accident could have consequences similar to an intentional biological event. Some of the most infamous laboratory incidents include:

• 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax leak (Soviet Union) — An accidental anthrax release from a military facility killed dozens and was concealed by Soviet authorities for years.
• 2004 SARS lab exposures (Singapore, Taiwan, China) — Researchers contracted SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) after laboratory accidents, exposing gaps in containment practices.
• 2007 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak (United Kingdom) — A leak linked to the Pirbright research complex was traced to infrastructure failures.
• 2014 CDC anthrax incident (United States) — Improper handling of live anthrax samples exposed personnel and triggered safety reviews.
• 2014 CDC influenza incident (United States) — Misidentified influenza samples were transferred to an unauthorized facility, raising oversight concerns.
• 2014 federal lab safety failures (United States) — Multiple pathogen-handling incidents prompted investigations into government biosafety practices.
• 2019 Brucella outbreak (China) — A vaccine facility leak in Lanzhou became one of the largest reported laboratory-associated outbreaks, infecting thousands and exposing failures in biosafety controls.

As the number of facilities handling dangerous pathogens and hazardous materials grows, the evidence suggests that the expansion of the biological research network has outpaced the systems designed to monitor and control it. The remaining debate is not whether oversight has fallen behind, but how governments and international institutions should respond.

Hashtag Picks

‘This Shouldn’t Have Happened:’ Final Report Details What Led To Conyers Bio-Lab Fire

The author writes, “The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board released the final report on the Bio-Lab fire in Conyers. … At the time of the fire, Bio-Lab was storing more than 14 million pounds of chemicals used to treat water used for pools and spas, according to investigators. That’s more than Bio-Lab told Rockdale County it would store when it obtained a permit to open a warehouse near Interstate 20 in Conyers in 2019.”

Bio-Attribution Challenge Yields Tools To Define Biothreat Origins at Speed, Scale

From DARPA: “Identifying the exact source of a biological threat — whether it stems from a naturally occurring outbreak, an accidental containment failure, or an intentionally engineered pathogen — is a complex but vital national security challenge. Rapid and precise attribution requires investigators to sift through an overwhelming amount of genomic and environmental data to pinpoint microscopic anomalies.” 

Two Illegal Biolabs Reveal Gaps in US Biosecurity

The author writes, “The discovery of CCP-linked biolabs on American soil exposes major biosecurity gaps. Policymakers must act to improve oversight of biological research activity.” 

Smuggling and Biolabs: The Growing Threat to America’s Biodefense From Within Our Borders 

The author writes, “Throughout American history, the overwhelming majority of bioterrorism threats have been local, domestic threats from non-state actors. … While multiple states have undoubtedly pursued massive biological weapons programs, it should be noted that there have been no confirmed uses of foreign biological agents within the United States. However, that does not mean that the threat is not real.” 

The Danger of ‘Invisible’ Biolabs Across the US (2023)

From Time: “Bio labs in the U.S. fall through the cracks of government oversight if they are privately operated (i.e., not academic or government), do not receive funding from the government, and are not working with select agents. These ‘invisible’ labs have much more leeway to work with pathogens that are not select agents but could still cause outbreaks, severe illness, and death — a category that includes some of the ones that the Reedley lab acquired.”

Investing in Pandemic Prevention Is Essential To Defend Against Future Outbreaks (2022)

From Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: “Although there was a gap of more than 100 years between the 1918 influenza pandemic and COVID-19, it would be a mistake to still think of pandemics as a once-in-a-century event. Scientists suggest that changes in climate and land-use patterns will increase the likelihood of new viruses emerging and create more opportunities for a pandemic-capable virus to make the jump from animals to humans.”